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STANDARDS OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
NICOLAS F DIEBOLD*
Abstract The principle of non-discrimination constitutes a corner-stone in
different fields of international economic law, notably international trade in
goods and services as well as intellectual property and investment protection.
While its basic rationale appears to be straightforward, the application of
the different legal elements which constitute a non-discrimination obligation
has proven to be most challenging. Adjudicating bodies have been applying
different interpretations and standards with regard to the legal elements of
‘less favourable treatment’, ‘likeness’ and ‘regulatory purpose’, which leads
to a high fragmentation of the non-discrimination principle in international
economic law. This article maps out the different theories for each of these
elements on the examples of WTO law, NAFTA, bilateral investment treaties
(BIT) and EU law and analyses how these theories affect the scope and
liberalizing effect of the non-discrimination obligation. The article then
attempts to develop a coherent factor-based application of non-discrimination
rules suitable for all fields of international economic law. The article submits
the theory that the elements of non-discrimination should not be applied as
strict legal conditions which must be proven by a complainant, but as a range
of factors which are weighed and balanced by the adjudicating bodies.
I. INTRODUCTION
The principle of non-discrimination has a long-standing history in international
trade relations and it has become a central pillar of modern international
economic law. The non-discrimination principle provides that contracting
parties to an international economic treaty shall not treat domestic market
actors more favourably than foreign market actors (national treatment, NT)
or differentiate between foreign market actors from different origins (most-
favoured-nation treatment, MFN). Non-discrimination obligations are found in
all fields of international economic law, notably trade in goods and services,
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investment protection and the protection of intellectual property rights. They
apply to all types of governmental trade obstacles, such as border measures
(eg tariffs and quantitative restrictions) and internal regulations (eg taxes and
product standards). In addition, it is well established that non-discrimination
obligations not only apply to measures which differentiate directly—or
de jure—on the basis of origin, but they also prohibit indirect—or de
facto—discriminatory measures.
In spite of these commonalities between non-discrimination obligations
of different economic treaties, it would be wrong to assume that non-
discrimination in international economic law has a firmly defined meaning.1
Adjudicating bodies apply different interpretations and standards with regard to
the elements of ‘less favourable treatment’, ‘likeness’ and ‘regulatory purpose’,
which leads to a variety of different standards of non-discrimination in
international economic law. The different standards may in some instances
be explained by different intentions, objectives and expectations of the con-
tracting parties or by different structures of the specific non-discrimination
clause or of the entire treaty. However, the economic rationale underlying non-
discrimination claims are very similar in trade and investment. In both cases, a
foreign market actor seeks access to a domestic market under equal competitive
parameters compared to domestic market actors. Hence, there are often times
when there is no apparent reason, other than pure arbitrariness, for applying
different standards in the respective fields of international economic law.
The rules of treaty interpretation set forth in article in 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘VCLT’),2 and reflected in customary
international law, leave considerable discretion to adjudicators interpreting
an obligation of public international law. The rules are not apt to ensure a
consistent application of the non-discrimination provisions. Even though it
appears that World Trade Organisation (‘WTO’) law has—to a certain degree
— assumed a leading role for the general interpretation of international
economic law, adjudicators applying a specific treaty have no obligation to
take into consideration the jurisprudential developments and precedents from
other fields of international economic law or even from prior arbitral tribunals
applying the exact same provision of the same treaty. Considering that for
historical and political reasons, international economic law is split up in
innumerable mostly self-contained bilateral, regional and multilateral treaties,
it is also not surprising that most scholarly contributions tend to focus on the
principle of non-discrimination as it applies in a specific field of international
economic law.3
1 G de Búrca, ‘Unpacking the Concept of Discrimination in EC and International Trade Law’ in
C Barnard and J Scott (eds), The Law of the Single European Market: Unpacking the Premises
(Hart Publishing 2002) 181, 182.
2 Adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980: 1155 UNTS 331.
3 As a notable exception N DiMascio and J Pauwelyn, ‘Nondiscrimination in Trade and
Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?’ (2008) 102 AJIL 48.
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Nonetheless, non-discrimination obligations are constantly applied by
international arbitral tribunals and, from a pragmatic perspective, the system
appears to function. However, the current situation entails a number of
shortcomings. Most importantly, contracting parties have no possibility to
accurately anticipate the consequences when entering into an international
economic treaty containing a non-discrimination clause. By the same token,
private individuals—to the extent the treaty empowers them to assert their
rights under the agreement—are virtually left in the dark when assessing
their rights and risks prior to an investment decision. The scope, substance
and standard of a non-discrimination obligation—and nota bene many other
obligations—depends on the interpretation of the individual adjudicators who
happen to be appointed to rule on the specific dispute. Moreover, even once the
arbitral tribunal makes its ruling by applying a specific treaty, the concerned
parties have no guarantee that a subsequent arbitral tribunal will follow the
same interpretation. Consequently, the parties to a dispute—whether in state-
to-state or investor-state arbitration—have little guidance on how to make
their claim, how to present their legal arguments and most importantly, what
evidence will be relevant. Granted, any legal proceeding—whether domestic or
international—involves a considerable degree of legal uncertainty, but the risks
and uncertainties are exceedingly high in disputes pertaining to international
economic law in general and to the non-discrimination obligation in particular.
Against the background of these fragmented standards of non-
discrimination, this article attempts to establish a typology of the theoretically
possible standards on the basis of previous practice in the law of the WTO,4 the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’),5 the North
American Free Trade Agreement (‘NAFTA’)6 and bilateral investment treaties
(‘BITs’).7 Part II compares the different standards which have been developed
by the WTO adjudicating bodies, the European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) and
arbitral tribunals with regard to the non-discrimination elements, namely the
‘comparator clause’, ‘less favourable treatment’ and ‘regulatory purpose’. This
overview does not pretend to provide an exhaustive and detailed analysis of the
specific most-favoured-nation and national treatment provisions in the different
agreements. Rather, Part II is designed to present a general analysis of the
4 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
(concluded 15 April 1994) 1867 UNTS 14; including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994 (GATT) (concluded 15 April 1994) Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 UNTS 187 and the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) (concluded 15 April 1994) Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1B, (1994) 33 ILM 1168.
5 Consolidated version, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, OJ 2008 C 115, 47–199; formerly
Treaty establishing the European Community ‘TEC’ (Consolidated version, as amended by the
Treaty of Amsterdam), OJ 2002 C 325, 33–184.
6 Concluded 17 December 1992 by the US, Canada and Mexico, in force 1 January 1994: 107
Stat 2057; (1993) 32 ILM 605.
7 BITs referred to in this paper are available at <http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/
DocSearch____779.aspx> .
Standards Of Non-Discrimination in International Economic Law 833
of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589311000418
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 07:26:18, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
different possible interpretations in order to illustrate to negotiators of
international economic treaties the ambiguities arising from the text of today’s
non-discrimination provisions and to provide an overview of the possible
standards of non-discrimination obligations to adjudicators and disputing
parties. On this basis, Part III develops a structure containing the main formal
and substantive elements which should be taken into consideration for the legal
analysis of a non-discrimination claim.
The purpose of this article is to propose a methodology for the drafting of
future non-discrimination obligations which is not based on ambiguous legal
elements or conditions subject to interpretation, but on clearly defined factors
which need to be weighed and balanced in order to determine whether overall
a measure amounts to unlawful discriminatory protection of domestic market
actors.8
II. CURRENT STANDARDS OF NON-DISCRIMINATION
The principle of non-discrimination consists of two main elements, both
of which are comparative in nature. First, the comparator clause calls for a
comparison between the market actors subject to differential treatment.9 The
second element requires a comparison between the treatments accorded to
themarket actors at issue in order to assess whether one is treated less favourably
than the other. The comparator clause and the element of ‘less favourable
treatment’ constitute two cumulative legal conditions.10 Depending on the
structure of a specific non-discrimination provision, additional elements may
be taken into consideration, such as ‘(non-)protectionist effect’ or ‘(non-)
protectionist purpose’. To date, the comparator clause—in particular the GATT
‘like products’ concept—has received by far the most attention in dispute
settlement and legal scholarship. More recently, the focus has also shifted to the
element of ‘less favourable treatment’ and its ambiguities.11 However, scholarly
research and case law does not yet sufficiently take into account the relationship
and interdependency between the two elements.
Each element may be subject to different interpretations and
standards, which considerably affects the reach of the non-discrimination
8 The approach of considering different elements on a case-by-case basis in order to assess
whether a measure amounts to unlawful discrimination has been supported most prominently
by J Pauwelyn, ‘The Unbearable Lightness of Likeness’ in M Panizzon and others (eds), GATS and
the Regulation of International Trade in Services (CUP 2008).
9 See also JY Qin ‘Defining Nondiscrimination under the Law of the World Trade
Organization’ (2005) 23 Boston U Intl LJ 215, 223.
10 WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products (EC—Asbestos) (adopted 5 April 2001) WT/DS135/AB/R [100].
11 L Ehring, ‘De Facto Discrimination in World Trade Law; National and Most-Favoured-
Nation Treatment—or Equal Treatment?’ (2002) 36 J of World Trade 921; Pauwelyn (n 8) 358; F
Ortino, ‘From “Non-discrimination” to “Reasonableness”: A Paradigm Shift in International
Economic Law’ (Jean Monnet Working Paper 2005), available at <http://ssrn.com/
abstract=922524> .
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obligation.12 The spectrum varies from very permissive forms of non-
discrimination obligations which only outlaw the most apparent and blatant
discriminatory measures, to very liberal and integrative forms which
considerably restrict the contracting parties’ regulatory autonomy to pursue
domestic policy objectives. The present part illustrates the different standards
by referring to examples from GATT 1947, WTO law (GATT 1994 and
GATS), EU law, NAFTA and BITs.
A. Different Standards and Terminology for ‘Comparator Clauses’
The fragmentation of comparator clauses in different international economic
treaties is readily apparent from the differences in the terminology employed.
Non-discrimination provisions in WTO law generally use the concept of
‘likeness’, such as ‘like products’ in articles I and III GATT or ‘like service and
service suppliers’ in articles II and XVII GATS. In addition, one GATT non-
discrimination provision applies the concept of ‘directly competitive or
substitutable products’ instead of ‘likeness’.13 The TFEU refers to ‘similar
products’ and ‘other products’ in its national treatment obligation concerning
internal taxes (article 110 TFEU). Finally, non-discrimination obligations in
NAFTA and certain BITs apply the concept of ‘like circumstances’,14 while
other BITs use the concept of ‘same circumstances’,15 ‘like situations’,16
‘comparable situations’17 or ‘similar situations’.18
In spite of these different terminologies, all comparator clauses share
the identical fundamental problem of identifying the relevant tertium
comparationis, ie the quality or element which two ‘situations’ or ‘objects’
must have in common in order to conclude that they are ‘alike’ for the purpose
of the comparison.19 The practice of international economic law determined
different tertia comparationis which in turn leads to different standards of non-
discrimination.
12 De Búrca (n 1); H Horn and J H Weiler, ‘European Communities—Measures Affecting
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products’ (2004) 3 World Trade Rev 129, 131ff; Ortino
(n 11) 14.
13 See art III:2 (second sentence) GATT in connection with Ad art III:2 GATT.
14 For an overview of comparator clauses in BITs see eg A Newcombe and L Paradell, Law and
Practice of Investment Treaties—Standards of Treatment (Kluwer 2009) 160; UNCTAD, National
Treatment (NY/Geneva: United Nations Publication 1999) 28ff, <http://www.unctad.org/
Templates/webflyer.asp?docid=191&intItemID= 2322&lang=1> .
15 UK-Belize BIT (1982) art 3(1).
16 US-Honduras BIT (1995) art II(1); US-Senegal BIT (1983), art II(2).
17 China-Iran BIT (2000) art 4(1). 18 Ethiopia-Turkey BIT (2000) art 3(1).
19 On the tertium comparationis for non-discrimination in trade law see J English,
Wettbewerbsgleichheit im grenzüberschreitenden Handel: Mit Schlussfolgerungen für indirekte
Steuern (Mohr Siebeck Gmbh & Co 2008) 293, 412 ff; in constitutional law see M Oesch,
Differenzierung und Typisierung—Zur Dogmatik der Rechtsgleichheit in der Rechtsetzung
(Stämpfli Verlag; Auflage 2008) 34–38, with references.
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1. Objective Standard
Early GATT 1947 jurisprudence pertaining to articles I (MFN) and III (NT)
interpreted the concept of ‘like products’ on the basis of purely formal and
objective criteria, mostly ignoring or even denying the relevance of
competition.20 For instance, GATT Panels ruled that ‘likeness’ does not exist
between three types of sardines (pilchard, herring and sprat) or between
dimension lumber produced from different tree species (SPF and hemlock-fir
lumber) for purposes of article III:2 GATT. Another GATT Panel explicitly
refused to consider the competitive relationship between ammonium sulphate
fertilizer and nitrate fertilizer and found the two products to be ‘unlike’.
Finally, the GATT Panel in EEC—Animal Feed Proteins held that different
products used for the purpose of adding protein to animal feeds are ‘unlike’
under articles I and III:4 GATT. All these reports relied heavily on different
tariff classifications as well as physical differences between the products as
criteria of the ‘likeness’ analysis.21 In 1970, a Working Party Report developed
a test which later came to be known as the Border Tax Adjustments framework,
identifying also ‘end-uses’ and ‘consumer tastes and habits’ as relevant
criteria.22 While these criteria may have implicitly introduced economic
elements into the analysis, most GATT Panels refrained from explicitly
recognizing that ‘likeness’ incorporates the economic theory of competitive
relationships.
Similar to GATT 1947 practice, early ECJ jurisprudence pertaining to the
national treatment obligation for internal taxes of article 110(1) TFEU (ex
article 90 TEC, ex-ex article 95 TEC) also relied on purely formal criteria—
such as fiscal, statistical or custom classification—for the assessment of the
‘similar products’ concept.23
While all of the above examples from GATT 1947 and EU jurisprudence
illustrate situations where formal criteria were used to find ‘unlikeness’
between largely competing products, formal criteria may be used to find
‘likeness’ between non-competing products. In the investor-state dispute
Occidental,24 for instance, the US oil exporter Occidental claimed that the
denial of VAT reimbursements to domestic and foreign-invested oil exporters,
while granting the reimbursement to domestic and foreign-invested exporters
20 For an overview see also M Melloni, The Principle of National Treatment in the GATT: A
Survey of the Jurisprudence, Practice and Policy (Emile Bruylant 2005) 122–25.
21 GATT Panel Report, Treatment by Germany of Imports of Sardines (Germany—Sardines),
G/26 (adopted 31 October 1952) BISD 1S/53 [13]; GATT Panel Report, Canada/Japan—Tariff on
Imports of Spruce, Pine, Fir (SPF) Dimension Lumber (Japan—SPF Dimension Lumber), L/6470
(adopted 19 July 1989) BISD 36S/167 [5.13]ff; GATT Working Party Report, The Australian
Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate (EEC—Animal Feed Proteins), GATT/CP.4/39 (adopted 3 April
1950) BISD II/188, [4.2].
22 GATT Working Party Report, Border Tax Adjustments, L/3464 (adopted 2 December 1970)
BISD 18S/97, [18]. 23 eg Case 27/67 Fink-Frucht [1968] ECR 223.
24 LCIA Arbitral Tribunal, Arbitral Award, Occidental Exploration and Production Company
v Ecuador, LCIA Case No UN3467, 1 July 2004 (US-Ecuador BIT).
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of other goods, constituted a breach of the non-discrimination obligation. The
claim was based mainly on the argument that ‘in like situations’ refers not to
companies in the same business sector, but to all companies engaged in exports
even across economic sectors. The tribunal distinguished the BIT ‘like
situations’ terminology from GATT ‘like products’ and essentially defined the
‘act of exporting’ as the relevant tertium comparationis.25 In consequence, the
foreign invested oil exporter Occidental was considered ‘in like situations’
with domestic exporters of flowers, mining and seafood products as well as
lumber and bananas.26
In sum, under the objective standard the tertium comparationis may consist
of factors such as physical characteristics, tariff classification, end-uses or even
the act of exportation. Depending on which criteria are applied, the scope of
non-discrimination obligations may be construed very narrowly (eg in case of
physical characteristics as criterion) or extremely broadly (eg act of exporting
as criterion).
2. Economic Standard
Under the economic standard, the tertium comparationis is defined by
economic parameters indicating the extent to which the market actors are in a
competitive relationship. This standard was first applied by GATT 1947 panels
for the ‘directly competitive or substitutable products’ element in article III:2
GATT and by the ECJ for the concept of ‘other products’ in article 110(2)
TFEU.27
Under WTO jurisprudence, the distinction between ‘like products’ and
‘directly competitive or substitutable products’ in article III GATT is gradually
disappearing.28 The WTO adjudicating bodies are more and more prepared to
extend the economic standard to the concept of ‘like products’. The Appellate
Body Report on EC—Asbestos nicely illustrates this change in approach with
regard to the assessment of discriminatory regulations (article III:4 GATT).29
25 ibid paras 168, 173, 176ff.
26 ibid paras 79, 168. The Occidental award has been subject to substantial criticism, see eg
J Kurtz, ‘The use and abuse of WTO Law in Investor-State Arbitration: Competition and its
Discontents’ (2005) 20 EJIL 749, 764ff; CQ McLachlan, L Shore and M Weiniger,
International Investment Arbitration—Substantive Principles (Gruyter; Auflage 2007) 252;
Newcombe and Paradell (n 14) 169–70; SD Franck, ‘Occidental Exploration & Production
Co. v Republic of Ecuador. Final Award. London Court of International Arbitration
Administered Case No. UN 3467’ (2005) 99 AJIL 675, 679; DiMascio and Pauwelyn (n 3) 85.
27 For the WTO see eg GATT Panel Report (n 21) [4.3]; for the EU see eg Case 170/78
Commission v UK, para 14 (competitive relationship between wine and beer).
28 At least for purposes of art III:2 GATT it appears that the ‘like products’ concept is interpreted
more narrowly than the ‘directly competitive or substitutable’ standard in that it requires both a
competitive relationship and physical similarities between the products.
29 EC—Asbestos (n 10) [99]: ‘a determination of “likeness” under Article III:4 is,
fundamentally, a determination about the nature and extent of a competitive relationship between
and among products’.
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However, even though the WTO adjudicating bodies recognized the relevance
of competitive relationships for the analysis of ‘likeness’ under this so called
‘market place approach’, they continue, in principle, to apply the formal
criteria from the Border Tax Adjustments framework.30
The ECJ jurisprudence pertaining to ‘similar products’ under article 110(1)
TFEU, which was developed in parallel to the WTO jurisprudence on
article III:2 GATT, moved from a formally objective interpretation to a test
also taking into account economic considerations.31 Consequently, the
difference between the concepts of ‘similar products’ in article 110(1) TFEU
and ‘other products’ in article 110(2) TFEU is gradually disappearing.
The same economic interpretation of ‘likeness’ will have to prevail
for the WTO national treatment obligation pertaining to trade in services, con-
sidering that article XVII:3 GATS explicitly states that it is designed to
protect competitive opportunities.32 In comparison, the WTO has not yet
had an opportunity explicitly to confirm an economic standard of ‘like
products’ for purposes of MFN (article I GATT),33 but numerous scholars
rightfully demand such an approach at least with regard to internal taxes
and regulations.34 Similarly, to date no jurisprudential guidance exists
30 See on this issue NF Diebold, ‘Assessing Competition in International Economic Law—A
Comparison of “Market Definition” and “Comparability” ’ (2011) 32 L Issues of Economic
Integration 115, 123.
31 Case 106/84 Commission v Denmark [1986] ECR 833, para 12: ‘it is necessary first to
consider certain objective characteristics . . . , and secondly to consider whether or not both
categories of beverages are capable of meeting the same need from the point of view of consumers’.
32 See also NF Diebold, Non-discrimination in International Trade in Services—‘Likeness’ in
WTO/GATS (CUP 2010) 117ff; Englisch (n 19) 414; PC Mavroidis, ‘ “Like Products”: Some
Thoughts at the Positive and Normative Level’ in T Cottier and PC Mavroidis (eds), Regulatory
Barriers and the Principle of Non-Discrimination in World Trade Law: Past, Present, and Future
(University of Michigan Press 2000) 126–27; JA Marchetti and PCMavroidis, ‘What Are the Main
Challenges for the GATS Framework? Don’t Talk About Revolution’, (2004) 5 Eur Business
Organization L Rev 511, 533; R Bhala, International Trade Law: Interdisciplinary Theory and
Practice, (3rd edn, LexisNexis/Matthew Bender 2007), 1589; EC submission in WTO Panel
Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting
Services (US—Gambling) (20 April 2005) WT/DS285/R [4.40].
33 In the more recent cases ‘likeness’ was either undisputed among the parties or the measure
differentiated on the basis of origin; the adjudicating bodies thus refrained from ruling on the issue
of ‘like products’; with regard to border measures see eg WTO Panel Reports, Canada—Certain
Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry (Canada—Autos) (19 June 2000) WT/DS139/R, WT/
DS142/R [10.16]; European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas [Complaint by the United States] (EC—Bananas III [US]) (25 September 1997) WT/
DS27/R/USA [7.62]; with regard to internal measures see eg WTO Panel Report, United States—
Import Measures on Certain Products from the European Communities (US—Certain EC
Products) (10 January 2001) WT/DS165/R and Add.1 [6.53]f; with regard to both internal and
border measures see eg WTO Panel Report, Indonesia—Certain Measures Affecting the
Automobile Industry (Indonesia—Autos) (23 July 1998) WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R,
WT/DS64/R and Corr.1 and 2, and Corr. 3 and 4, [14.113].
34 RE Hudec, ‘ “Like Product”: The Differences in Meaning in GATT Articles I and III’, in
Cottier and Mavroidis (eds) (n 32) 108–09; WJ Davey and J Pauwelyn, ‘MFNUnconditionality’, in
Cottier and Mavroidis (eds) (n 32) 35; JH Jackson, WJ Davey and AO Sykes, Legal Problems of
International Economic Relations—Cases, Materials and Text (5th ed, West 2008) 489 in fine;
more nuanced MJ Trebilcock and R Howse, The Regulation of International Trade (3rd ed,
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with regard to the standard of ‘likeness’ in article II GATS on MFN-
treatment.35
Finally, most arbitral tribunals applying the NAFTA rules on investment
protection largely endorse an economic interpretation of the ‘like circumstances’
concept, even though the jurisprudence is not entirely consistent. The main
criterion generally is whether investors or investments are in the ‘same sector’,
including both economic and business sectors. While some tribunals omit
explicitly to identify the competitive relationship as the decisive factor to delimit
a ‘sector’, others base their analysis more specifically on competition.36
3. Subjective Standard
The subjective standard of ‘likeness’ has been developed by different
adjudicating bodies of international economic law in order to strike a balance
between international obligations designed to liberalize trade and investment
on the one hand, and domestic non-economic policy objectives such as
environmental and consumer protection on the other hand. The doctrinal
reasoning of the subjective standard is to argue that the tertium comparationis
is defined by the regulatory purpose of the measure under scrutiny; for
instance, if the measure is designed to protect the environment, then the
products are compared on the basis of their environmental impact.
GATT 1947 jurisprudence developed a subjective standard with the so
called ‘aim and effects’ test as part of the ‘like products’ analysis.37 Following
this approach, a GATT Panel ruled that low and high alcohol content beers
are not ‘alike’ for the purpose of article III:4 GATT because the measures
restricting points of sale, distribution and labelling were aimed to encourage
the consumption of low alcohol beer. Conversely, wines made from different
grapes were found to be ‘like products’ mainly because the respondent was
unable to provide any valid public policy purpose in support of its differential
Routledge 2005) 66–67; WM Choi, ‘Like Products’ in International Trade Law—Towards a
Consistent GATT/WTO Jurisprudence (OUP 2003) 97; sceptical also S Charnovitz, ‘Green Roots,
Bad Pruning: GATT Rules and their Application to Environmental Trade Measures’ (1994) 7
Tulane Environmental LJ 299, 323; Qin (n 9) 241.
35 Favouring an economic interpretation of ‘likeness’ in GATS art II: Diebold (n 32) 135ff; A
Lang, ‘The GATS and Regulatory Autonomy: A Case Study of Social Regulation of the Water
Industry’ (2004) 7 J of Intl Economic L 822 822–23; C Pitschas, ‘GATS’, in J Prieß and GM
Berrisch (eds),WTO-Handbuch—World Trade Organisation (Beck Juristischer Verlag 2003) 495,
514.
36 SD Myers v Canada, para 244; Pope & Talbot v Canada, para 78; Feldman v Mexico, para
171; ADM v Mexico, paras 198ff; Corn Products v. Mexico, paras 121–22; but see UPS v Canada,
paras 102, 173ff; Methanex v US, part IV(B), paras 30ff, in particular para 37; all available at
<www.naftaclaims.com>.
37 Note that some commentators understand the aim and effects test as a self-standing
substantive element within non-discrimination, as opposed to a variation of the ‘likeness’ element
as suggested here; see eg M Krajewski, National Regulation and Trade Liberalization in Services
—The Legal Impact of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) on National
Regulatory Autonomy (Kluwer 2003) 100.
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tax treatment.38 While subsequently WTO panels and the Appellate Body
strongly rejected the ‘aim and effects’ test for purposes of both GATT and
GATS,39 the very recent Panel report US—Clove Cigarettes has again taken
into account the regulatory context under the ‘likeness’ analysis for purposes of
the non-discrimination provision in article 2.1 TBT Agreement.40
Similar to the ‘aim and effects’ test, most arbitral tribunals ruling on NAFTA
non-discrimination provisions in the area of trade in services and investment
protection interpret the concept of ‘like circumstances’ as containing a
subjective element. Following this rationale, the question is not whether the
foreign and domestic suppliers or investors are in ‘like circumstances’, but
whether the differential treatment occurs in ‘like circumstances’. In other
words, the policy objective pursued by the measure under scrutiny may be
taken into consideration to define the circumstances in which the comparison
of the foreign and domestic comparators takes place.41
The same result is likely to prevail in certain BIT non-discrimination
clauses. For instance, the former Norwegian draft model-BIT nicely illustrates
the subjective standard by means of a footnote to the ‘like circumstances’
concept:
1. Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party and to their
investments, treatment no less favourable than the treatment it accords in like
circumstances[fn] to its own investors and their investments, in relation to the
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and
disposal of investments.
[fn] The Parties agree/are of the understanding that a measure applied by a
government in pursuance of legitimate policy objectives of public interest such as
the protection of public health, safety and the environment, although having a
different effect on an investment or investor of another Party, is not inconsistent
with national treatment and most favoured nation treatment when justified by
38 GATT Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages (US
—Malt Beverages) (19 June 1992) DS23/R, BISD 39S/206 [5.23–26], [5.70–77]; see also GATT
Panel Report, United States—Taxes on Automobiles (US—Taxes on Automobiles) (11 October
1994 unadopted) DS31/R [5.10]; both cases commented by RE Hudec, ‘GATT/WTO Constraints
on National Regulation: Requiem for an “Aim and Effects” Test’ (1998) 32 Int’l Law 619, 627.
39 WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan—Alcoholic
Beverages II) (1 November 1996) WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R [8];
EC—Bananas III (US) (n 33) [241].
40 WTO Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove
Cigarettes (US—Clove Cigarettes) (2 September 2011) WT/DS406/R [7.244]: ‘As we have
explained, we believe that such legitimate objective must permeate and inform our likeness
analysis’.
41 On chapter 12 trade in services NAFTA Arbitral Panel, Final Report in the Matter of Cross-
Border Trucking Services (6 February 2001) USA-MEX-1998-2008-01 [249]ff; on chapter 11
investment protection Pope & Talbot v Canada, para 78; SD Myers v Canada, paras 248ff;
Feldman v Mexico, paras 181ff; Corn Products v Mexic, paras 120, 136; T Weiler, ‘Prohibitions
Against Discrimination in NAFTA Chapter 11’, in T Weiler (ed), NAFTA Investment Law and
Arbitration: Past Issues, Current Practice, Future Prospects (Transnational Publishers 2004) 37ff,
referring to a ‘like circumstances exception’.
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showing that it bears a reasonable relationship to rational policies not motivated
by preference of domestic over foreign owned investment.42
The main challenges of this approach are to determine the legitimate policy
objectives and the appropriate standard for the reasonable relationship between
the measure under scrutiny and the pursued objective (see below, II.C.3).
4. Combination of Standards
The objective, economic and subjective standards of ‘likeness’ may be applied
individually or in combination. WTO adjudicating bodies combine the
economic and objective standard for purposes of certain GATT non-
discrimination provisions. For instance, ‘like products’ in terms of article
III:1 GATT, first sentence, is interpreted as requiring both physical similarity
and a competitive relationship. In comparison, the concept of ‘like circum-
stances’ as contained in NAFTA rules on non-discrimination is usually
interpreted as providing both an economic and a subjective standard allowing
differentiation between competing investors or service suppliers in order to
pursue legitimate domestic policy objectives.
5. Absence of a Comparator Clause
Finally, the comparator clauses are not only highly fragmented in terms of their
terminology and application; some international economic treaties even
contain non-discrimination obligations that entirely lack a comparator clause.43
The absence of a comparator clause may be subject to two different inter-
pretations. The first and preferred approach consists of the argument that a
comparative element is inherent to the logic and structure of the non-
discrimination principle in international economic law.44 Consequently, the
claimant would still have to establish the existence of a competitive re-
lationship between the allegedly discriminated foreign market participant and a
domestic market participant who is receiving more favourable treatment.
Conversely, under the second theory the absence of a comparator clause entails
that competitive relationships or any other form of ‘likeness’ between the
42 Norway withdrew its model-BIT in June 2009, see Investment Treaty News, June 2009,
<http://www.iisd.org/itn/?view=archives> ; former draft version available at <http://www.
regjeringen.no/upload/NHD/Vedlegg/hoeringer/Utkast%20til%20modellavtale2.doc> .
43 See eg art 3 of the German model-BIT (1998), reproduced in UNCTAD, International
Investment Instruments: A Compendium, vol VII (NY/Geneva: United Nations Publisher 2002),
298, available at <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/dite3vol7_en.pdf> ; also Switzerland-India BIT
(1997) art 4.
44 In this sense see eg Nykomb Synergetics v Latvia, 34 (on art 10[1] of the Energy Charter
Treaty): ‘in evaluating whether there is discrimination in the sense of the Treaty one should only
“compare like with like” ’; Consortium RFCC v Morocco, para 53 (on Italy-Morocco BIT (1990));
also Newcombe and Paradell (n 14) 160; OECD, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment:
Commentary to the Consolidated Text, Negotiating Group on the Multilateral Agreement
on Investment, DAFFE/MAI(98)8/REV1 (1998) 11, <http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/
ng988r1e.pdf> .
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domestic and foreign comparators are irrelevant. Consequently, equal
treatment would have to be accorded to foreign and domestic market actors
across economic sectors.45
B. Different Standards of ‘Less Favourable Treatment’
The term or standard of ‘less favourable treatment’ is usually not defined in
non-discrimination provisions of international economic treaties. As a notable
exception, article XVII:3 GATS states that ‘different treatment shall be
considered to be less favourable if it modifies the conditions of competition’.
GATS incorporates the interpretations from prior GATT 1947 panel reports
which developed the principle of conditions of competition under the
analogous provision of article III GATT.46 Considering that non-
discrimination obligations aim to ensure equal conditions of competition for
foreign and domestic market actors, it is logically consistent that differential
treatment is only relevant to international economic law to the extent it
modifies the conditions of competition to the detriment of certain foreign
market actors. In principle, this rationale not only applies to international trade,
but also to investment protection law.47 However, the standards or thresholds
with regard to the element of ‘less favourable treatment’ differ considerably.
1. Disproportionate Disadvantage Test
The disproportionate disadvantage test requires assessing the negative (and
potentially neutral or positive) economic effect of a measure on the group—as
defined by the comparator clause—of domestic and foreign market actors.48
The non-discrimination obligation is only breached if the group of foreign
45 In this sense R Adlung and M Molinuevo, ‘Bilateralism in Services Trade: Is There Fire
Behind the (BIT-) Smoke?’ (2008) 11 J of Intl Economic L 365, 383–84; C Stadler, Die
Liberalisierung des Dienstleistungshandels am Beispiel der Versicherungen: Kernelemente
bilateraler und multilateraler Ordnungsrahmen einschliesslich des GATS (Duncker & Humblot
1992) 141; UNCTAD (n 14) 34.
46 The first report to adopt this standard was GATT Panel Report, Italian Discrimination
Against Imported Agricultural Machinery (Italy—Agricultural Machinery), L/833 (23 October
1958) BISD 7S/60 [12]; see also W Zdouc, Legal Problems Arising under the General Agreement
on Trade in Services—Comparative Analysis of GATS and GATT (Difo-Druck 2002) 172–73;
F Ortino, ‘The Principle of Non-Discrimination and its Exceptions in GATS’ in K Alexander
and M Andenas (eds), The World Trade Organization and Trade in Services (Martinus Nijhoff
2008) 175. 47 But see, Pope & Talbot v Canada, para 57.
48 This test is also referred to as ‘asymmetric impact test’, ‘disparate impact view’,
‘discriminatory effect test’, ‘aggregate comparison approach’ or ‘narrow’ standard of de facto
discrimination; see eg Ehring (n 11) 924–25; DH Regan, ‘Regulatory Purpose and “Like Products”
in Article III:4 of the GATT (With Additional Remarks on Article III:2)’ (2002) 36 J of World
Trade 443, 470; Davey and Pauwelyn (n 34) 38–41; J Pauwelyn, ‘Recent Books on Trade and
Environment: GATT Phantoms Still Haunt the WTO’ (2004) 15 EJIL 575, 583; F Ortino, ‘WTO
Jurisprudence on De Jure and De Facto Discrimination’ in F Ortino and EU Petersmann (eds), The
WTO Dispute Settlement System 1995–2003 (Kluwer 2004) 260; Krajewski (n 37) 108–09.
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market actors is disproportionately disadvantaged as compared to the domestic
one.
Even though WTO jurisprudence is not entirely consistent on this issue, it
appears that the Appellate Body explicitly endorsed the disproportionate
disadvantage test in EC—Asbestos. In this case, the Panel ruled that the French
sales ban for products containing asbestos fibres violated GATT national
treatment, arguing that products containing asbestos fibres are ‘like’ products
containing substitute fibres and that the measure resulted in less favourable
treatment of asbestos products not produced in France. The Appellate Body
reversed the Panel’s ruling primarily on grounds of ‘likeness’, but it also
reversed the Panel’s approach in regard to ‘less favourable treatment’ in an
obiter dictum. The Appellate Body held that ‘a complaining Member must
[. . .] establish that the measure accords to the group of “like” imported
products less favourable treatment than it accords to the group of domestic
products’.49 This approach is supported by most commentators of WTO law.50
In comparison, the ECJ also adopts the disproportionate disadvantage test in
order to demonstrate whether a tax is of protective nature for purposes of article
110(2) TFEU prohibiting tax discrimination:
The protective nature of the tax system . . . is clear. A characteristic of that system
is in fact that an essential part of domestic production . . . come within the most
favourable tax category whereas at least two types of product, almost all of which
are imported from other Member States, are subject to higher taxation . . . . The
fact that another domestic product . . . is similarly placed at a disadvantage does
not rule out the protective nature of the system . . . .51
Considering the fact that a measure may have negative economic effects on
certain competitors and no or even positive effects for other competitors, the
disproportionate disadvantage test requires establishing a ratio threshold for
‘disproportionality’. Assume, for instance, a theoretical model situation where
hundred domestic products stand vis-à-vis hundred imported ‘like’ products.
Presumably no ‘less favourable treatment’ occurs if domestic and foreign
products are equally affected (eg ten domestic vs ten foreign or seventy
domestic vs seventy foreign). However, there remains a large range between,
for instance, a negative effect on ten foreign vs five domestic or ninety-five
49 WTO Panel Report, EC—Asbestos WT/DS135/R and Add. 1 [8.155], as modified by WTO
Appellate Body Report, EC—Asbestos (n 10) [100] (emphasis partly added); also US—Clove
Cigarettes (n 40) [7.269].
50 Comprehensively English (n 19) 394, 428ff; also Ehring (n 11), 942–46; Davey and
Pauwelyn (n 34) 38–41, discussing whether the ‘discriminatory effect’ should play a role in the
analysis of arts III and I GATT; Ortino (n 4848) 258–62; Ortino (n 46) 179–85; DiMascio and
Pauwelyn (n 3) 66; F Ortino, Basic Legal Instruments for the Liberalisation of Trade—A
Comparative Analysis of EC and WTO Law (Hart Publishing 2004) 336ff; S Puth, WTO und
Umwelt: Die Produkt-Prozess-Doktrin (Duncker u. Humblot GmbH 2003) 251; Pauwelyn (n 8)
364.
51 Case 168/78 Commission v French Republic [1980] ECR 00347, para 41; (nb ‘come’ should
read ‘comes’). For an overview and references to ECJ jurisprudence see Ehring (n 11) 948–49.
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foreign vs ten domestic products. It remains in the discretion of the
adjudicators to define an appropriate ratio for each specific case.
2. Obligation to Grant the Best Treatment Accorded to any Domestic
Market Participant
The non-discrimination principle may also be interpreted as an obligation to
grant the best treatment accorded to any domestic market actor.52 Following
this approach the non-discrimination obligation is already breached if one
individual foreign market actor receives treatment that is less favourable in
comparison to any individual domestic market participant (NT) or to any
foreign market participant from different origin (MFN). For instance, less
favourable treatment occurs if a measure negatively affects only one out of
hundred foreign market actors, even if ninety-nine out of hundred domestic
market actors are also negatively affected. Consequently, the non-
discrimination principle becomes an obligation to treat all foreign market
participants equivalent to the best treatment accorded to any ‘comparable’
domestic or other foreign market participant. Under this approach, non-
discrimination has a strong liberalizing effect and far reaching consequences
for the regulatory autonomy of the contracting parties, in particular if
additionally the comparator clause is interpreted widely.
This very liberal and intrusive interpretation is mostly adopted in the area of
investment protection.53 In particular, the jurisprudence pertaining to NAFTA
chapter 11 shows a clear tendency towards this ‘best treatment’ approach.54 For
instance, the tribunal in Pope & Talbot ruled ‘that “no less favorable” means
equivalent to, not better or worse than, the best treatment accorded to the
comparator’.55
The main argument made in support of this far reaching standard is that
investment treaties are designed to protect the value of a specific investment,
whereas international trade law protects a more abstract value of equal
conditions of competition, not the actual value of the exported goods and
services. This argument has some merit, insofar as the investment in a foreign
52 This test is also referred to as ‘diagonal test’.
53 Same opinion Ortino (n 11) 22–24; TJ Grierson-Weiler and IA Laird, ‘Standards of
Treatment’ in P Muchlinski and others (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment
Law (OUP 2008) 293; DiMascio and Pauwelyn (n 3) 77; AK Bjorklund, ‘National Treatment’ in
A Reinisch (ed), Standards of Investment Protection (OUP 2008) 54–56.
54 Grierson-Weiler and Laird (n 53) 293.
55 Pope & Talbot v Canada, paras 42, 43–72; see also ADM v Mexico, para 205: ‘Claimants and
their investment are entitled to the best level of treatment available to any other domestic investor or
investment operating in like circumstances’; Loewen v US, para 140: ‘What Article 1102(3)
requires is a comparison between the standard of treatment accorded to a claimant and the most
favourable standard of treatment accorded to a person in like situation to that claimant’;Methanex v
US, part IV(B), para 21: ‘the investor or investment of another party is entitled to the most
favourable treatment accorded to some members of the domestic class’; less clear Thunderbird v
Mexico, para 177, but see Separate Statement by TW Wälde, Thunderbird v Mexico, para 105.
844 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589311000418
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 07:26:18, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
market is a more substantial and binding commitment to participate in the
foreign market than merely exporting goods and services. A new regulation—
for instance an environmental standard—may have severe consequences for
the foreign investor who, in case he is unable to comply with the standard, may
have to disinvest and suffer actual damages. Conversely, a foreign producer
unable to meet the new standard may simply cease to export without incurring
actual damages, but only loss of potential gains.56
Yet, this circumstance is taken care of in that investment treaties accord to
the foreign investor an individual right to claim damages, whereas trade
agreements are only enforceable by the governments of the contracting parties
which may only claim the abolition of the measure, but not damages. It is not
entirely apparent, however, why the arguably different objects of protection in
investment and trade law (ie value of investment vs conditions of competition)
should also explain different substantive standards of non-discrimination
obligations. In fact, most investment treaties go beyond the protection of
foreign direct investment, in that they also apply to more mobile forms of
investments, such as minority equity investment or debt holdings.57 These
types of investments are not subject to the same sunk costs as foreign direct
investment and may even be retracted from the foreign market. Hence, if
different objects protected by the respective economic treaties were apt to
justify different standards of non-discrimination obligations, more than one
standard would already have to apply in the context of investment law.
Moreover, distinguishing between a ‘best treatment’ standard for investment
protection law and a ‘disproportionate impact’ standard for trade law is not
appropriate in view of the fact that trade agreements may also apply to forms of
investments. For instance, measures affecting trade in services under GATS
mode 3 (commercial presence) would presumably have to be analysed under a
disproportionate impact test in line with the Appellate Body’s interpretation of
‘less favourable treatment’, even though the concept of commercial presence
constitutes a form of investment. Conversely, some WTO panels have applied
a standard along the lines of the ‘best treatment approach’ for purposes of the
GATT national treatment provision in the trade context.58
56 Note, however, that in certain circumstances a foreign producer of products may also suffer
actual damages, for instance if goods or services imported by a state-controlled entity remain
unpaid.
57 See eg DARWilliams, ‘Jurisdiction and Admissibility’ in Muchlinski and others (eds) (n 53)
878ff, referring to awards qualifying promissory notes, loans and bank guarantees as investment;
see also V Heiskanen, ‘Of Capital Import: The Definition of “Investment” in International
Investment Law’ in AK Hoffmann (ed), Protection of Foreign Investment through Modern Treaty
Arbitration, ASA Special Series No 34 (2010) 56, arguing that in certain cases an investment claim
may arise out of an ordinary commercial transaction.
58 WTO Panel Report (EC—Asbestos) (n 49) [8.155]ff; Ehring (n 11) 942–43.
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Similar examples exist in other areas of international economic law. For
instance, it is to be expected that non-discrimination provisions in NAFTA
chapter 12 on trade in services would follow the same standard as those in
chapter 11 on investment protection in view of the similar terminology and
structure of articles 1102ff and articles 1202ff, even though in substance
chapter 12 is more closely related to the trade rules of NAFTA chapter 3 than
to the rules on investment protection. Even within NAFTA chapter 11, the
interpretation lacks consistency in that some tribunals seemed to favour
the disproportionate disadvantage test which is generally applied in the trade
context.59
The more practical and pragmatic explanation for the different standards
of non-discrimination in trade and investment protection may be found in the
form of the challenged measure, rather than in the object protected by the
respective treaty. In fact, the measures challenged in investor-state cases often
consist of (individual and concrete) decisions by an authority applying to one
foreign investor, whereas the measures challenged in trade disputes typically
concern (general and abstract) regulations applying to all competitors in a
relevant market. The ‘best treatment’ approach is arguably more appropriate
with respect to ‘decisions’, as the concerned investor would only have to show
that it is the only actor in a relevant market suffering from a competitive
disadvantage due to the decision in question. In contrast, in order for a
regulation to be discriminatory, the complainant must show that the group of
foreign products suffers a higher competitive burden from the regulation than
the group of ‘like’ domestic products.
These considerations illustrate that the circumstances may very well justify a
‘best treatment’ or similar standard in a trade case, whereas the ‘best treatment’
approach may just as well lead to absurd results in investment protection law.
In view of the inconsistency in the interpretation of this core element of non-
discrimination and the resulting lack of legal security, it would be preferable
for international economic treaties to either specifically spell out the applicable
standard in the agreement or to explicitly empower the arbitral tribunal with
the competence to determine the applicable standard on a case-by-case basis.
3. Subjective Standard of ‘Less favourable Treatment’
The subjective standard of ‘less favourable treatment’ takes into account the
regulatory purpose in order to determine the true basis of the differential
treatment. In the case of de jure discrimination, the measure differentiates
directly on the basis of origin. However, cases of de facto discrimination
differentiate directly on the basis of a permitted criterion. Under the different
approaches to ‘less favourable treatment’ discussed above, the link from the
59 See SD Myers v Canada, para 252; similarly also Corn Products v Canada, para 138, which
examined both effect and intent of the measure.
846 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589311000418
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 07:26:18, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
permitted to the prohibited criterion is presumed if predominantly foreign
products suffer a competitive disadvantage under the measure (ratio threshold).
In contrast, the subjective standard requires determining whether the measure
truly pursues an objective related to the permitted criterion, or whether the true
intent of the measure is to discriminate indirectly on the basis of origin.
This subjective theory of ‘less favourable treatment’ has not yet been
explicitly recognized by the WTO adjudicating bodies or by arbitral tribunals.
Some commentators understood the Appellate Body’s obiter dictum in EC—
Asbestos as a return of the ‘aim and effects’ test under the element of ‘less
favourable treatment’;60 however, in this case the Appellate Body only
addressed the issue of ratio, but not of purpose.61
More pertinently, the Panel in EC—Approval and Marketing of Biotech
Products seemed to consider a subjective standard of ‘less favourable
treatment’:
Argentina is not alleging that the treatment of products has differed depending on
their origin. In these circumstances, it is not self-evident that the alleged less
favourable treatment of imported biotech products is explained by the foreign
origin of these products rather than, for instance, a perceived difference between
biotech products and non-biotech products in terms of their safety, etc. In our
view, Argentina has not adduced argument and evidence sufficient to raise a
presumption that the alleged less favourable treatment is explained by the foreign
origin of the relevant biotech products.62
Most recently, the US argued in the WTO dispute US—Tuna II, that its
‘dolphin safe’ labelling provisions do not draw a distinction based on the origin
of the tuna, but based on whether the tuna products contain tuna caught in a
manner harmful to dolphins. The US further argues that there is a relationship
between the purpose of the measure—which is to reduce the harm to dolphins
and to properly inform consumers—and the conditions set forth by the
measure by which tuna products can be labelled ‘dolphin safe’.63 In essence,
the US argument goes to say that the non-discriminatory intent of the measure
shows that the differential treatment is not based on origin, but based on the US
60 R Howse and E Tuerk, ‘The WTO Impact on Internal Regulations’ in G De Búrca and J Scott
(eds), The EU and the WTO: Legal Constitutional Issues (Hart Publishing 2001) 299; R Howse,
‘The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A new Legal Baseline for the Trade and
Environment Debate’ (2002) Columbia J of Environmental L 493, 515; A Porges and JP
Trachtman, ‘Robert Hudec and Domestic Regulation: The Resurrection of Aim and Effects’ (2003)
37 J of World Trade 783, 796; Trebilcock and Howse (n 34) 103; Horn and Weiler (n 12) 147;
Lang (n 35) 831; see also Ortino (n 48) 261.
61 Also rejecting this interpretation Ehring (n 11) 945–46.
62 WTO Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and
Marketing of Biotech Products (21 November 2006) WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/
R, Add.1 to Add.9, and Corr.1 [7.2514] (emphasis added).
63 United States—Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna
Products (DS381), Answers of the US to the Second Set of Questions from the Panel to the Parties,
19 January 2011, paras 32ff, <http://www.ustr.gov/node/5714> .
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objective of protecting dolphins. The Panel seems to have followed the US
argument at least to a certain degree, finding that the ‘dolphin safe’ labelling
provision does not result in less favourable treatment of Mexican tuna under
article 2.1 TBT Agreement:
We first note that, the fact that the measures distinguish between fish based on
its capture method rather than its origin, this distinction is not inherently tied to
the “national” origin of the fish. The fishing method at issue, setting on dolphins,
is accessible to any fleet operating in an area where such method can be practised.
Therefore, denying the label to tuna caught by “setting on dolphins” does not,
in itself, imply that “less favourable treatment” is afforded to Mexican tuna
products. Indeed, any fleet operating anywhere in the world must comply with the
requirement.64
The Panel then went on to conclude that even if tuna of Mexican origin might
be more likely not be eligible for the ‘dolphin safe’ label, this would not
necessarily mean that the tuna products processed and canned in Mexico would
be less likely to qualify for the label. In the Panel’s words, this ‘is because
Mexican processors could choose to make their products from tuna of other
origins meeting the requirements of the label’.65 In sum, it appears that the Panel
was at the very least inspired by the purpose of the measure when concluding
that, even de facto, the labelling provision does not differentiate based on origin.
C. Different Standards and Relevance of ‘Regulatory Purpose’
The main objective of non-discrimination obligations in international
economic law is to outlaw measures which are specifically designed to protect
the domestic market from foreign competition. However, even measures which
pursue a legitimate policy objective—such as measures setting standards
related to health, environment, labour or human rights—may have a
protectionist effect. In such cases, most international economic treaties provide
that the policy objective of the measure is taken into account for the legal
analysis. However, there are two different systemic approaches as to whether
the purpose of a regulatory measure is analysed as part of the non-
discrimination obligation itself or as a justification under the general
exceptions clause.66
1. Regulatory Purpose as Part of the Non-Discrimination Standard
As discussed above, the regulatory purpose may be considered as part of the
comparator clause or as part of the ‘less favourable treatment’ element, to
64 WTO Panel Report, United States—Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and
Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US—Tuna II) (15 September 2011) WT/DS381/R [7.305]
(emphasis added). 65 ibid [7.310].
66 De Búrca (n 1) 191, speaks of ‘definitional stage’ and ‘justificatory stage’.
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the extent that a subjective standard is applied. This solution is very rarely
explicitly adopted by international economic treaties, but adjudicating bodies
occasionally choose one of these two approaches by applying and interpreting
a specific non-discrimination obligation. A look at the relevant cases pertaining
to non-discrimination provisions shows that this solution is mostly adopted
when the treaty lacks a general exceptions clause. This is the case, for instance,
for many BITs, NAFTA chapter 11 and the TBT Agreement.
Alternatively, the regulatory purpose could be considered as a distinct
and separate legal element within the non-discrimination obligation. However,
international economic treaties do not provide a textual basis for such an
approach. The only provision allowing for some flexibility in this regard is
article III:1 GATT, which states that measures ‘should not be applied to
imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic
production’.67 Even though the Appellate Body emphasized that the test for
the wording ‘so as to afford protection’ is about protective application, not
about protective intent,68 indications of protectionist intent regularly flow into
the legal analysis.69
From a practical and pragmatic point of view, it seems irrelevant whether
the regulatory purpose is considered under the comparator clause, the ‘less
favourable treatment’ element or as a distinct and separate element. However,
from a doctrinal and systemic angle it would be welcomed if the jurisprudence,
or preferably the treaties themselves, would clarify whether and under which
title the purpose of an allegedly discriminatory measure may be analysed. Such
transparency would enhance legal certainty and facilitate the parties to a
dispute in building their legal arguments. For clarity and structural reasons,
the regulatory purpose should ideally be considered as its own legal
element. However, due to the lack of a textual basis, adjudicating bodies
mostly rely on the comparator clause or to a lesser extent on the element of
‘less favourable treatment’ for taking into account the purpose of a regulation.
67 According to WTO jurisprudence on GATT art III:2, second sentence, the element ‘applied
so as to afford protection’ is incorporated in the legal test by reference to paragraph 1 of art III and
must thus be separately analysed, Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II (n 39) 25ff.
68 ibid 29: ‘It is irrelevant that protectionism was not an intended objective if the particular tax
measure in question is nevertheless, to echo Article III:1, “applied to imported or domestic products
so as to afford protection to domestic production”. This is an issue of how the measure in question
is applied’; confirmed in WTO Appellate Body Reports, Chile—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages
(Chile—Alcoholic Beverages) (12 January 2000) WT/DS87/AB/R, WT/DS110/AB/R [61]f, [71];
Korea—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Korea—Alcoholic Beverages) (17 February 1999)
WT/DS75/AB/R, WT/DS84/AB/R [149].
69 WTO Panel Report, Mexico—Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages (Mexico—
Taxes on Soft Drinks) (24 March 2006) WT/DS308/R [8.91]: ‘the declared intention of legislators
and regulators of the Member adopting the measure should not be totally disregarded’; Chile—
Alcoholic Beverages (n 68) [71]: ‘The conclusion of protective application reached by the Panel
becomes very difficult to resist, in the absence of countervailing explanations by Chile’; WTO
Appellate Body Report, Canada—Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals (Canada—
Periodicals) (30 July 1997) WT/DS31/AB/R [30]ff, referring to statements by the Canadian
government about the protectionist purpose of the measure.
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2. Regulatory Purpose under the General Exceptions Clause
Under the second theory, the regulatory purpose is taken into account only
once it is established that the measure under scrutiny is in breach of the non-
discrimination obligation. This approach requires incorporating an explicit
justification or exception clause in the structure of the respective international
economic treaty. Importantly, general exception clauses not only legitimize the
violation of a non-discrimination obligation, but also violations of other
substantive obligations set forth in the respective treaty, such as the prohibition
of quantitative restrictions.
International trade agreements regularly provide for a general exceptions
clause. Article XX GATT, for instance, allows WTO Members to deviate
from their obligations under GATT in order to pursue public interests such as
the protection of public morals, of exhaustible natural resources or of human,
animal and plant life or health.70 The lists of public interests serving as grounds
for justification in article XX GATT, article XIV GATS and most other
trade agreements are exhaustive in nature. Consequently, general exceptions
clauses only address interests which were recognized as important at the time
the treaty was concluded, but due to their static nature, they fall short of
addressing new concerns, such as for instance environmental or consumer
protection.
One way of addressing new policy concerns in the framework of trade
treaties would be to broadly interpret the general exceptions clauses. However,
adjudicating bodies ruling on bi- and multilateral trade agreements generally
lack the legitimacy to engage in legislative interpretation or to extensively
depart from the treaty text of general exceptions clauses.71 Only the ECJ
transformed the general exceptions clause of article 36 TFEU (ex article 30
TEC) from an exhaustive to an illustrative list of public interests in order to
counter-balance its very liberal application of the Cassis de Dijon concept,72
generally referred to as principle of origin.
Another way of circumventing the limited scope of general exceptions
clauses is to incorporate the regulatory purpose as an element into the standard
of non-discrimination by adopting a subjective approach to ‘likeness’ or to
70 On the general exceptions clause see eg NF Diebold, ‘The Morals and Order Exceptions in
WTO Law’ (2008) 11 J of Intl Economic L 43, 44.
71 See eg Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU)
(concluded 15 April 1994), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2, 1869 UNTS 401; 33 ILM 1226 (1994), art 3.2 in fine: ‘Recommendations and rulings of
the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.’
72 Case C-120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR
649; T Cottier, P Delimatsis and NF Diebold, ‘Commentary to Article XIV’ in R Wolfrum and
others (eds), WTO—Trade in Services: Max Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law, vol 6
(Brill 2008) 287, 297–98.
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‘less favourable treatment’ as described above.73 Adjudicating bodies ruling on
trade disputes frequently use this approach, be it explicitly or implicitly, in
order to resolve a conflict between free international trade and a domestic
policy concern of the State that is bound by a non-discrimination obligation.74
In contrast to trade agreements, most investment protection treaties do not
contain any general exceptions clause. NAFTA, for instance, provides for a
general exceptions clause with respect to trade in goods and trade in services
(article 2101 NAFTA), but not with respect to chapter 11 on the protection of
investments. This may be the reason why many investment tribunals ruling on
a discrimination claim tend to consider the purpose of the measure as part of
the non-discrimination obligation by adopting one of the approaches analyzed
under Parts II.A.3 and II.B.3 above.
3. Legal Challenges Related to the Analysis of a Measure’s Regulatory
Purpose
While a proper consideration of a discriminatory measure’s policy objective
may provide the ‘most just’ result, adjudicating bodies are confronted with a
number of very sensitive problems when analyzing the regulatory purpose of a
State measure.
First, consideration of the regulatory purpose raises issues with respect to
burden of proof, means of proof and standard of review. An unreasonably high
bar would be raised by placing the burden on the complainant to prove a
protectionist purpose of the respondent’s measure. Preferably, it should be up
to the respondent to demonstrate that its measure pursues a non-protectionist
and legitimate objective. Either way, direct evidence of protectionist intent will
rarely exist, considering that numerous governmental actors and interest groups
are usually involved in the decision-making process. The disputing parties thus
have to rely mostly on circumstantial evidence related to the design, structure,
application and effect of a measure. In this context, the question arises of how
much deference the adjudicating bodies should give to the respondent’s evi-
dence and assertions concerning the purpose of its own measure. This is a very
sensitive issue related to the question of the appropriate standard of review.75
73 See Parts II.A.3, II.B.3 and II.C.1.
74 Scholars oftentimes criticize the implicit consideration of a measure’s regulatory purpose in a
non-discrimination analysis, see eg F Roessler, ‘Beyond the Ostensible—A Tribute to Professor
Robert Hudec’s Insight on the Determination of the Likeness of Products under the National
Treatment Provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’ (2003) 37(4) JWT 771, 781;
Diebold (n 32) 84, with references.
75 See eg Appellate Body Report, Australia—Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples
from New Zealand (17 December 2010) WT/DS367/AB/R [173]: the purpose of a measure is to be
determined ‘not only from the objectives of the measure as expressed by the responding party, but
also from the text and structure of the relevant measure, its surrounding regulatory context, and the
way in which it is designed and applied.’ (concerning the SPS Agreement); also Diebold (n 32)
87ff, with references.
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Second, the adjudicators must determine which policy objectives are
considered as sufficiently important and thus legitimate to justify a measure
which—indirectly or directly—discriminates between foreign and domestic
competitors. Some international economic treaties directly define the legitimate
policy objectives. General exceptions clauses, for instance, set forth a list of
legitimate objectives agreed upon by the contracting parties during the
negotiations. As stated above, such lists are usually regarded as exhaustive;
only the ECJ transformed the general exceptions clause of article 36 TFEU
(ex article 30 TEC) from an exhaustive to an illustrative list of public interests
serving as grounds for justification.76 Conversely, adjudicating bodies may
have more flexibility in defining new legitimate policy objectives if no such
treaty mandated exhaustive lists exist, by simply taking the regulatory purpose
into account under the comparator clause or under the element of ‘less
favourable treatment’.
Third, a legitimate objective itself is not sufficient to justify the breach of a
non-discrimination obligation; there must also be a certain nexus between the
measure under scrutiny and the legitimate objective pursued. Most treaties
which provide a justification or general exceptions clause explicitly state the
required nexus. For instance, articles XX GATT and XIV GATS differentiate
between measures which are ‘necessary’ to achieve the pursued policy
objective or merely ‘related to’ the policy objective. Again, the adjudicating
bodies are more flexible in defining the relevant nexus applying a subjective
interpretation of the comparator clause or the element of ‘less favourable
treatment’ if no treaty mandated standard exists.
Considering that any decision on any of these issues has far reaching
consequences for the contracting parties’ sovereignty and regulatory auton-
omy, it would be highly preferable that the international treaty either defines
the applicable rules with respect to burden of proof, standard of review,
legitimacy of objectives and standards of nexus or that the treaty specifically
empowers and legitimizes the adjudicating body to develop the necessary rules
on a case by case basis.
D. Overlap Between Non-Discrimination and Non-Restriction
Depending on how each element of the non-discrimination obligation is
construed, the result may be that non-discrimination overlaps with the more
integrative principle of non-restriction (Beschränkungsverbot). The legal
concept of non-restriction goes much further in trade liberalization than the
principle of non-discrimination. It is fundamental, for instance, to the freedom
to provide services under EU law. According to the ECJ, article 56 TFEU
76 See (n 72).
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(ex article 49, ex-ex article 59 TEC)77 ‘requires not only the elimination of
all discrimination against a person providing services on the ground of his
nationality but also the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies without
distinction to national providers of services and to those of other Member
States, when it is liable to prohibit or otherwise impede the activities of a
provider of services established in another Member State where he lawfully
provides similar services.’78
Some commentators suggest that the national treatment obligation under
WTO law should be interpreted as prohibiting any measure which is more
burdensome than necessary for foreign goods, services or suppliers.79 Under
this approach, the elements of ‘less favourable treatment’ and ‘likeness’ are in
effect replaced by a test of necessity and proportionality.80
Another way of assimilating non-discrimination to non-restriction would be
to combine the ‘best of the best treatment’ approach for ‘less favourable
treatment’ with a broad economic interpretation of the ‘comparator clause’. As
it would be almost always possible to determine at least one distant competitor
receiving more favourable treatment, the principle of non-discrimination would
in essence be transformed into an obligation of non-restriction.
Finally, the overlap between non-discrimination and non-restriction
becomes even more apparent where broad objective criteria such as ‘the act
of exporting’ are applied under the ‘comparator clause’, which results in a
comparison of different treatments concerning non-competing products. For
instance, the true question in Occidental was not whether the differential tax
77 Art 56 TFEU reads: ‘restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Community shall
be prohibited in respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a State of the
Community other than that of the person for whom the services are intended’.
78 Case C-76/90 Säger v Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd. [1991] ECR I-04221, para 12 (emphasis
added); Case C-17/00 De Coster v Collège des bourgmestre et échevins de Watermael-Boitsfort
[2001] ECR I-9445, para 29; Case C-43/93 Vander Elst v Office des Migrations Internationales
[1994] ECR I-3803, para 14; S O’Leary, ‘The Free Movement of Persons and Services’ in P Craig
and G de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP 1999) 402; M Holoubek, ‘EGVArtikel 49/
50’ in J Schwarze and others. (ed), EU-Kommentar (2nd ed, Nomos Verlagsges.Mbh 2009), 726ff.
79 Note that some commentators suggest ‘necessity’ as an independent substantive standard,
while others see ‘necessity’ as an additional element to ‘less favourable treatment’ and ‘likeness’
within non-discrimination; see eg A Mattoo, ‘National Treatment in the GATS—Corner-Stone or
Pandora’s Box?’ (1997) 31(1) J of World Trade 107, 131ff; A Mattoo and A Subramanian,
‘Regulatory Autonomy and Multilateral Disciplines: The Dilemma and a Possible Resolution’,
(1998) 1 JIEL 303, 315–16; A Mattoo, ‘Shaping Future GATS Rules for Trade in Services’,World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper (2001), 15, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=632665>; G
Verhoosel, National Treatment and WTO Dispute Settlement—Adjudicating the Boundaries of
Regulatory Autonomy (Hart Publishing 2002), 51ff; M Cossy, ‘Some Thoughts on the Concept of
“Likeness” in the GATS’ in Panizzon and others (eds) (n 8) 327, 346ff; A Mattoo, ‘MFN and the
GATS’ in Cottier and Mavroidis (eds) (n 32) 78; on this issue in general but rejecting a broad
‘necessity’ approach Krajewski (n 37) 109–10; M Krajewski and M Engelke, ‘Commentary to
Article XVII’ in Wolfrum and others (eds) (n 72) 396, 412.
80 See eg art 16 of the EC Services Directive 2006/123/EC, OJ 2006 L 376/36.
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treatment between exporters of oil and exporters of flowers is discriminatory,
but whether the tax treatment of foreign invested oil exporters is more
burdensome than necessary or whether it violates legitimate expectations. It is
highly questionable, however, whether the extensive interpretation of a non-
discrimination obligation along the lines of Occidental is in conformity with
the contracting parties’ intended level of economic integration.
III. A FLEXIBLE FACTOR-BASED STANDARD OF NON-DISCRIMINATION
Considering that the interpretation of non-discrimination obligations in inter-
national economic law lacks coherence—which in turn creates legal un-
certainty for the contracting parties, individuals and parties to a dispute—this
part attempts to develop a factor-based framework for non-discrimination
obligations. Pauwelyn in particular has argued that the non-discrimination
analysis should treat ‘likeness’ as a mere threshold question and focus more
specifically on ‘less favourable treatment’ as the substantive test, taking into
account a mix of elements to determine whether differential treatment is based
on origin.81 This part takes up this theory, suggesting that the entire analysis of
non-discrimination obligations could be viewed as a threshold question. In
other words, ‘less favourable treatment’, ‘likeness’ and other ambiguous
elements such as ‘so as to afford protection’ or ‘regulatory purpose’ should no
longer be implemented as strict legal conditions to be proven by the
complainant or the respondent pursuant to the applicable standard of review.
Instead, all the relevant elements could be viewed as factors to be weighed and
balanced in order to come to an overall conclusion on whether or not a measure
amounts to unlawful discrimination of foreign market actors.
Importantly, this article does not address the question whether specific
existing non-discrimination provisions of WTO law, the TFEU, NAFTA, BITs
or other international economic treaties provide a textual basis for such an
approach. The more modest aim is to make adjudicating bodies aware of the
significance and mutual relationship of the different legal elements and to
propose an alternative approach to the concept of non-discrimination for the
negotiations of future national treatment and MFN provisions.
A. Formal Basis of Differential Treatment
The first analytical step should be to determine whether the measure
differentiates directly on the basis of origin (de jure) or on the basis of other
criteria (de facto). All forms of de jure differentiations affecting the competitive
opportunities to the detriment of foreign market actors constitute a strong factor
81 Pauwelyn (n 8) 361–62, 366–67; DiMascio and Pauwelyn (n 3) 83; see also S Lester and B
Mercurio, World Trade Law: Text, Materials and Commentary (Hart 2008) 321.
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pointing towards unlawful discrimination. The discriminatory effect of such
measures does not need any further analysis. However, the respondent must
still have the opportunity to justify the measure by proving its legitimate policy
objective and a strong nexus between the measure and the objective under
scrutiny. In addition, the respondent may show that the measure does not
accord a competitive advantage to domestic market actors due to the complete
absence of any even remotely competing domestic goods or services.
In case the measure differentiates on a basis other than origin (de facto
discrimination), the analysis needs to focus strongly on the effect of the
measure in a specific market situation (below, Part III.D).
B. Form of the Measure
A second formal element that needs to be taken in consideration is whether the
measure is adopted in the form of an individual and concrete decision adopted
by an authority applying exclusively to a foreign market actor, or whether the
measure consists of a general and abstract regulation applying to all products
in a relevant market. The form of the measure has no value in itself for
purposes of the weighing and balancing test. In other words, a decision is not
per se more or less discriminatory than a regulatory measure. However, the
form of the measure must be viewed in context with its effect.
For instance, a foreign investor subject to a decision should be able to
demonstrate the measure’s discriminatory effect by showing that only one
domestic competitor is not subject to the same competitive constraints (‘best
treatment’ standard), provided that the foreign and domestic investors are in
like regulatory circumstances (‘subjective standard’ of non-discrimination).
Conversely, it is unlikely that one single foreign market actor suffering a
competitive disadvantage from a regulatory measure could claim that it is
subject to discriminatory treatment if all its foreign and domestic competitors
are not negatively affected by the same measure.
C. Extent of Competitive Relationship between Comparators
The current terminology used in non-discrimination provisions referring to
‘like’ or ‘similar’ products, situations or circumstances does not do justice to
the underlying question of whether or not there is a competitive relationship
between the foreign and domestic market actors. Often the wording of the
comparator clause invites the adjudicating bodies to take into account the
purpose of the regulation. While this subjective approach may be appropriate
from a pragmatic perspective due to the lack of a general exceptions clause in
the respective agreement, it does not live up to the required standards for legal
security, consistency and transparency. Conversely, current comparator clauses
may allow the adjudicating bodies to find illegal discrimination between
market entities which are not in a competitive relationship at all. This approach
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is also not satisfying as it opens the door to an unlimited number of irrelevant
tertia comparationis, thereby stretching the principle of non-discrimination
beyond its original purpose and scope. By comparing, for instance, an export
tax on oil with the absence of such a tax on flowers, the true rationale is
not whether foreign oil investors are treated less favourably than domestic
growers of flowers, but whether the export tax on oil constitutes an un-
necessary obstacle to trade or investment. Hence, regulations with no effect
between domestic and foreign competitors should not be dealt with under a
non-discrimination obligation, but under the more integrative instruments
such as non-restriction in trade or legitimate expectations in investment
protection.
To date, the economic concept is best reflected in Ad article III paragraph 2
of the GATT Annex I, which incorporates a standard of ‘directly competitive
or substitutable’ products. Another interesting solution had been proposed
during the GATS negotiations. An early draft of the GATS national treatment
provision contained a specific reference to the marketplace, prohibiting
differential treatment of foreign and domestic services and suppliers ‘in the
same market’.82 Future non-discrimination provisions in international econ-
omic agreements should follow these examples, prompting the adjudicating
bodies to assess the approximate extent of the competitive relationship by
focusing on the economic theory of demand substitutability.
D. Competitive Effect of the Measure
Once the approximate extent of the competitive relationship between the
foreign and domestic market entity has been established, the question becomes
whether there is less favourable treatment of the foreign entities. For this
purpose, the adjudicating bodies need to analyse the competitive effect of the
measure, both qualitatively and quantitatively, as well as the ratio of affected
domestic and foreign market actors.
1. Qualitative Analysis
The qualitative analysis of a measure requires identifying the parameters of
competition which are affected by a measure. Parameters of competition are
market factors such as price, quantity, quality, marketing, general conditions,
terms of delivery, customer service, etc. For instance, measures banning
foreign products from the market, thereby neutralizing all parameters of
competition, or measures affecting key parameters such as price or quantity of
certain foreign products, are of the highest qualitative burden. In comparison,
product regulations, technical regulations, environmental regulations or
82 GNS, Report to the Trade Negotiations Committee meeting at Ministerial level, Montreal,
December 1988, MTN.GNS/21, 25 November 1988, para 11.
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administrative burdens may result in lower qualitative burdens, depending on
which parameters of competition they affect. In such cases, the complainant
needs to demonstrate how and to what extent the measure puts the foreign
product or investment at a competitive disadvantage as compared do its
domestic competitors.
2. Quantitative Analysis
Even more importantly, a measure’s quantitative effect on competition must
also be taken into consideration. The quantitative effect is primarily determined
based on the additional burden placed on the foreign market entities by the
measure. Ideally, the additional burden should be assessed in costs, which is
relatively easy in the case of taxes. For instance, depending on the cost of the
actual product, a tax differential of 1 per cent may be considered to have a low
competitive effect, whereas a differential of 30 per cent would presumably
result in a strong distortion of competition.
The quantitative effect of the measure may then be placed in relation to the
competitive relationship. If the foreign and domestic entities are in a very close
competitive relationship, then a very small quantitative effect of the measure—
such as a small differential tax or a small administrative burden—may be
sufficient to constitute a breach of the non-discrimination obligation.
Conversely, if the market players only compete very remotely, then the
quantitative effect of the measure needs to be of a higher intensity so as to
amount to illegal discrimination. This rationale of placing the quantitative
effect of the measure in relation to the competitive relationship is currently
reflected in the national treatment provisions of articles III:2 GATT and 110
TFEU with regard to taxes. For instance, if the products are ‘like’ in terms of
article III:2, first sentence, GATT (ie competing and physically similar), every
even very small difference in taxation to the detriment of imported products
meets the ‘in excess of’ requirement and thus violates national treatment; no de
minimis exception is granted.83 In contrast, if the products in question are not
‘like’, but nevertheless in direct competition or substitutable (ie competing
regardless of physical differences), the requirements on the difference in
taxation are more strict. In these cases, a supplemental de minimis tax on
imported products is not sufficient to find a breach of GATT article III:2,
second sentence, and, unlike in the case of the first sentence, the taxation must
be construed so as to afford protection.84
83 In case of de facto discrimination, it could even be argued that the standard of ‘less favourable
treatment’ for art III:2, first sentence, follows the diagonal test, meaning that the tax violates GATT
even if only one imported product is taxed more heavily. This broad interpretation of ‘less
favourable treatment’ is counterbalanced with a very narrow interpretation of ‘likeness’.
84 Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II (n 39) 28.
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3. Ratio Analysis
Another very important aspect that needs to be taken into account for the
weighing and balancing test is the competitive effect of the measure on
domestic as compared to foreign market entities. A new regulatory measure
may have a positive or a negative competitive effect on a concerned market
entity, or it may have no competitive effect at all. The ratio analysis requires
assessing how the positive, negative or neutral effect is distributed among the
foreign and domestic market entities. Instead of imposing a pre-defined
standard, such as the ‘disproportionate disadvantage test’ or the ‘best
treatment’ approach, the adjudicating bodies should have the flexibility to
weigh and balance the ratio in light of the competitive relationship, the relevant
market and the form of the measure. For instance, a measure is likely to amount
to unlawful discrimination if it negatively affects predominantly foreign market
entities in a narrowly defined market (ie with strong competitive relationship
and high demand elasticity). Conversely, on the other end of the spectrum
would be a measure which negatively affects only few or one foreign market
entity in a broadly defined market (ie low competitive relationships with low
demand elasticity).
In sum, the higher the competitive relationship between the market entities
which are affected by the measure, the fewer foreign entities need to
be negatively affected for the measure to amount to unlawful discrimination
(‘best treatment’ approach). Conversely, if the entities affected by the measure
are only remotely in competition, then discrimination would only occur if the
measure negatively affects predominantly foreign market entities (‘dispropor-
tionate impact’ approach).
4. Supply Substitutability and Temporal Considerations
A final aspect that may be taken into consideration when assessing the effect of
a measure relates to the issue of supply substitutability and temporal markets.
Supply substitutability focuses on the question of what costs and within which
time frame a supplier could switch its production from product A to product
B. This analysis is particularly pertinent to assess the market position of a
company for purposes of antitrust law. In the context of non-discrimination,
however, the focus lies not on the market position, but on the ability—in terms
of cost and time—of the foreign market entity to escape the negative effect of
the measure by, for instance, making its product compliant with the regulation
under scrutiny.85 More specifically, if a foreign producer is banned from
importing its product because it fails to meet a new environmental standard,
85 At least oneWTO Panel considered this aspect of ‘adaptation costs’ under the element of ‘less
favourable treatment’, US—Tuna II (n 64) [7.342]: ‘We do not exclude that costs of adaptation to a
technical regulation may be pertinent to an examination of whether less favourable treatment is
being afforded with respect to a technical regulation’; see also Diebold (n 30) 129ff.
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then the discriminatory effect could be mitigated by the fact that the foreign
producer could relatively easily (ie at low costs and within a short period of
time) switch its production from the non-compliant to a compliant product.
Consequently, high supply substitutability could be considered as a factor
supporting the conclusion that a measure does not amount to unlawful
discrimination. Ideally, the costs for the foreign market entity to switch from a
non-compliant to a compliant product or service should be viewed in relation to
the importance and value of the policy objective pursued by the measure.
E. Regulatory Purpose of the Measure
A final element which may be taken into consideration is the regulatory
purpose of the measure under scrutiny. Importantly, the regulatory purpose
should have its own value and should not be incorporated into the analysis of
the previous elements.
1. Protectionist Purpose
It is up to the complainant to produce evidence of a protectionist purpose. In
the rare cases where direct evidence shows that a measure was adopted with the
aim to pursue a protectionist purpose, such evidence should be considered as a
very strong—albeit not by itself decisive—indication that the measure amounts
to unlawful discrimination. Direct evidence could be obtained from official
documents or press coverage related to the legislative history of the measure.
In most cases the complainant is more likely to produce circumstantial
evidence pointing towards protectionist intent of the responding government.
However, the most important type of circumstantial evidence is the effect of the
measure which is already taken into account as its own element. In addition,
circumstantial evidence could relate to the design, structure and application
of a measure.86 Elements to be considered are, for instance, the purpose and
objective of the government and legislature ‘to the extent that they are given
objective expression in the statute itself’,87 unexplained changes in drafts
during the legislative history88 or the application of differential standards.89
86 See R Howse and DH Regan, ‘The Product/Process Distinction—An Illusory Basis for
Disciplining ‘Unilateralism’ in Trade Policy’ (2000) 11 EJIL 249, 265, who argue that objective
evidence by itself may be sufficient, but that all evidence—subjective and objective—must be
‘carefully evaluated’.
87 Chile—Alcoholic Beverages (n 68) [62]; commented by H Horn and PC Mavroidis, ‘Still
Hazy after All These Years: The Interpretation of National Treatment in the GATT/WTO Case-law
on Tax Discrimination’ (2004) 15 EJIL 39, 49; on objective assessment of intent also Cossy (n 79)
348.
88 WTO Appellate Body Report, Australia—Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon
(Australia—Salmon) (6 November 1998) WT/DS18/AB/R [170].
89 ibid [176]: ‘The Panel merely stated its doubts on whether Australia applies similarly strict
sanitary standards on the internal movement of salmon products within Australia as it does on the
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Finally, the absence of a credible non-protectionist purpose could also be
considered as circumstantial evidence of a protectionist purpose.
2. Non-Protectionist Purpose
While the complainant seeks to show protectionism, the respondent may
submit evidence demonstrating that the measure was adopted with the
objective to protect a public interest, such as health, morals, public order,
environment, natural resources etc. Such an alleged non-protectionist purpose
must not only be balanced with the previous elements, but it must also be
analysed under the principle of necessity or, more broadly, the principle of
proportionality.
a) Importance of the Public Interest
The contracting parties have it in their hands to negotiate either an exhaustive
or an enumerative list of public interests that may be protected in violation of
a non-discrimination obligation. Considering that the need for the protection
of unforeseen interests may arise at short notice, an open list of public
interests appears to be preferable. In many cases the contracting parties would
have great difficulty to find a consensus for amending the exceptions of
an existing international economic agreement. However, in order to prevent
overreaching justifications, the adjudicating bodies need to have the authority
to evaluate the objective value or importance of the allegedly protected public
interest. This may be a difficult task as it entails second guessing the national
values of sovereign contracting parties with different institutional, political
and religious traditions.90 Consequently, the value of the pursued public
interest cannot by itself be a decisive element in the analysis, but more a
consideration that reinforces the tendencies of the previous elements. For
instance, the protection of a minor public interest may reinforce the
conclusion that a measure is not discriminatory in cases where the measure
differentiates de facto between remotely competing market entities and has a
low qualitative and quantitative effect on few foreign entities. Conversely, a
universally very important public interest, such as human life and health, may
be used to justify measures which differentiate on a formal basis or between
strongly competing market entities to the detriment of predominantly foreign
entities.
importation of salmon products and considered that as a factor which can be taken into account in
the examination under the third element of Article 5.5’.
90 Such an evaluation of domestic values may also be required under current general exceptions
clauses, for instance when the adjudicating bodies are asked to decide whether a protected value
falls under the public morals or public order, see Diebold (n 70) 60ff.
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b) Nexus between the Public Interest and the Respondent’s Territory
Following the general territoriality principle of public international law, a
sovereign State is generally prohibited from adopting extraterritorial
measures which infringe the sovereignty of another State. Consequently,
the question whether and to what extent a nexus exists between the policy
objectives pursued by the regulatory State and its territory needs to be taken
into account under the aspect of regulatory purpose. This nexus is usually
existent in cases where a measure concerns a foreign investor or service
supplier who is present on the territory of the regulatory State. In the case of
trade in goods, no concerns of territoriality arise if the measure sets certain
standards in order to pursue a domestic non-economic public interest, such
as the protection of domestic health, environment or consumers. In contrast,
an importing State may be inhibited from restricting the import of products
for reasons of insufficient process or production methods used in the State of
production, unless there is a nexus between the ‘extraterritorial’ value and
the domestic territory. For instance, in the case US—Shrimp the Appellate
Body recognized a sufficiently strong nexus between the United States’
import ban on shrimp caught without a turtle excluder device and the United
States territory due to the fact that sea turtles sought to be protected
may migrate to the waters subject to United States jurisdiction.91 The ban
was designed to protect exhaustible natural resources under article XX(g)
GATT.
c) Nexus between the Measure and the Objective
Finally, the most important element that needs to be considered in the analysis
of the regulatory purpose is the extent of a nexus or causality between the trade
restrictive measure and its objective. Such a nexus is crucial in order to avoid
the risk that a measure under scrutiny is overly trade restrictive in view of
achieving the pursued objective. For instance, a total import ban of cigarettes
may not be necessary to achieve certain objectives related to ensure the quality
or to reduce consumption of cigarettes.92 This aspect is currently embodied
in the general exceptions clauses, which require that a measure must be
‘necessary to protect’ or ‘related to the protection of’ a certain public interest
(see eg articles XX GATT and XIV GATS). The factor-based approach to non-
discrimination proposed here would not prescribe a fixed threshold, such as
‘necessity’ or ‘related to’, but it would allow the adjudicating bodies to weigh
and balance nexus-related factors in light of the analysis of the previous
factors. The necessity test, for instance, requires a process of weighing and
91 Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products (US—Shrimp) (6 November 1998) WT/DS58/AB/R [33].
92 See eg GATT Panel Report, Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on
Cigarettes (Thailand—Cigarettes) (7 November 1990) DS10/R, BISD 37S/200 [81].
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balancing a series of factors, namely (i) the relative importance of the interest
protected by the measure, (ii) the contribution of the measure to the protection
of the policy objective and the public interest, (iii) the impact of the measure on
trade, (iv) the existence of alternative measures in light of (v) the level of
protection chosen by the responding Member (eg zero-risk level).93 Under the
factor-based approach, the arbitral tribunals would not be bound by a specific
threshold, such as ‘necessary’ or ‘related to’, but they would add the extent to
which the measure contributes to the protection of the policy objective as an
additional factor to the overall analysis.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: A FLEXIBLE RANGE OF STANDARDS
This article analysed how each of the legal elements ‘less favourable
treatment’, ‘likeness’ and ‘regulatory purpose’ constituting the non-
discrimination obligation may be subject to different interpretations and
how each interpretation affects the scope and integrative effect of the non-
discrimination principle. Depending on how each element is interpreted and
combined with the respective interpretation of another element, the non-
discrimination obligation can be extremely intrusive or very permissive.94 The
following interpretations are possible:
Comparator Clause
– Under the objective standard the tertium comparationis may consist of
factors such as physical characteristics, tariff classification, end-uses,
environmental impact or even the act of exportation;
– Under the economic standard, the tertium comparationis is defined by
economic parameters indicating the extent to which the market actors are in
a competitive relationship;
– Under the subjective standard the tertium comparationis is defined by the
regulatory purpose of the measure under scrutiny;
– The objective, economic and subjective standards of ‘likeness’ may be
applied individually or in combination.
93 WTO Appellate Body Reports, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and
Frozen Beef (Korea—Various Measures on Beef) (10 January 2001) WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/
DS169/AB/R [164]; EC—Asbestos (n 10) [172]; United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (US—Gambling) (20 April 2005) WT/DS285/
AB/R [306]; Dominican Republic—Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of
Cigarettes, (Dominican Republic—Import and Sale of Cigarettes) (19 May 2005) WT/DS302/
AB/R [70].
94 For a different categorization see eg Horn and Weiler (n 12) 131ff; Ortino (n 11), 14; Diebold
(n 32) 94ff.
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Less Favourable Treatment
– The disproportionate disadvantage test analyses whether the group (as
defined by the comparator clause) of foreign market participants is
disproportionately disadvantaged as compared to the domestic one.
Different thresholds of disproportionality are theoretically possible;
– The ‘best treatment’ approach leads to an obligation to grant the best
treatment accorded to any domestic market participant to all foreign
‘comparable’ (as defined by the comparator clause) market participants;
– The subjective standard of ‘less favourable treatment’ takes into account the
regulatory purpose in order to determine the true basis of the differential
treatment.
Regulatory Purpose
– The regulatory purpose may be considered as part of the non-discrimination
obligation itself (definitional stage), either (i) within the comparator clause
(aims [and effects] test), (ii) within the ‘less favourable treatment’ element,
or (iii) as its own substantive element;
– Alternatively, the regulatory purpose may be considered as part of a general
exceptions clause (justificational stage).
Considering this wide variety of different possible interpretations and the lack
of any guidance in most international economic law treaties, it would be
preferable for such treaties explicitly to empower the adjudicating bodies to
construe the non-discrimination obligation on a case-by-case basis. At the
same time, the treaty should spell out the factors which the adjudicating bodies
need to take into consideration under an overall weighing and balancing test.
This article suggests an approach along the following lines:
First, the treaty should specifically spell out that all forms of de jure
discrimination are considered a prima facie violation of the non-discrimination
obligation and thus create a presumption of illegality. The respondent may only
justify the measure by showing (i) that it has no impact on the competitive
relationship or (ii) that it protects an important public interest and that there is a
strong nexus between the measure and its objective as well as between the
measure and the respondent’s territory.
Second, prima facie violation of the non-discrimination obligation may also
be established in case the complainant is able to produce direct evidence
proving the protectionist intent on behalf of the respondent. Measures
specifically designed to protect certain domestic market actors would not be
justifiable. However, as a complainant will hardly ever be able to produce such
evidence, this intent-based standard of non-discrimination is likely to remain
theoretical.
Third, with regard to measures not formally differentiating on the basis of
origin, the treaty should explicitly state that such measures are subject to an
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analysis of their protectionist effect in the market place. The following criteria
need to be taken into consideration for the assessment of the measure’s
protectionist effect:
– The extent of the competitive relationship between disadvantaged foreign
market actors and domestic market actors;
– Form of the measure (ie individual and concrete decision or general and
abstract regulation);
– The measure’s qualitative effect on competition (ie parameters of
competition restricted by the measure);
– The measure’s quantitative effect on competition (ie extent of the additional
burden or the competitive disadvantage imposed by the measure);
– The measure’s effect on domestic vs foreign market entities (ie ratio of
negative competitive impact between domestic and foreign market
participants);
– Supply substitutability (ie costs and time for foreign market actors to escape
the negative competitive impact of the measure);
– Regulatory purpose of the measure, taking into account:
(i) the relative importance of the public interest sought to be protected;
(ii) the nexus between the measure and its objective; and
(iii) the nexus between the measure and the regulatory country’s territory.
The adjudicating bodies need to conduct a weighing and balancing test on
the basis of these factors in order to determine whether a measure amounts
overall to unlawful de facto discrimination. For instance, a clear violation of
the non-discrimination obligation would occur in case (i) a measure affects
only or predominantly imported market entities (ratio analysis) (ii) and
constitutes a strong negative impact on an important parameter of competition
(quantitative and qualitative elements) (iii) in a narrowly defined relevant
market consisting of products, services or investments with high demand
substitutability (competitive relationship); moreover (iv) foreign participants
are unable to substitute their good or service with another one not subject to the
trade restrictive measure (supply substitutability) and, finally, (v) the measure
does not pursue a legitimate policy objective (regulatory purpose).
In practice it would be very rarely the case that all the factors clearly
show that the measure under scrutiny either violates or complies with a non-
discrimination obligation. Hence, under the factor-based approach suggested
here it would still be difficult to accurately predict whether a given trade
restrictive measure violates a certain non-discrimination obligation. However,
the main advantage of this approach is that at least there would be significant
legal security with regard to the applicable legal test and, to a certain degree,
the legal standard of non-discrimination obligations. Due to the clarity of the
legal test, it would be much easier for the parties in a dispute to make their case
by bringing forward the pertinent arguments. At the same time, such a factor
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based-test for non-discrimination is sufficiently flexible to allow adjudicating
bodies to consider the framework and purpose of the agreement in which
the obligation is found. Most importantly, the arbitral tribunals could set
the appropriate standard in light of the fact that trade agreements aim to
protect competitive opportunities and equal conditions of competition, whereas
investment protection agreements are designed to protect the value of a specific
investment.
Finally, it is important to point out that the factor-based solution for non-
discrimination provisions entails the risk that the analysis will focus much
more on the purpose and necessity of a measure than on the elements of
differential treatment and comparability. In fact, adjudicating bodies may be
tempted to qualify a measure as discriminatory if the measure does not pursue a
legitimate policy objective or if the respondent fails to demonstrate a nexus
between an alleged objective and the measure. Hence, arbitral tribunals must
pay attention not to overemphasize the possible absence of a legitimate purpose
in comparison to the elements of ‘likeness’ and ‘less favourable treatment’, in
order to avoid undue extension of the non-discrimination provision into a more
integrative obligation of non-restriction. The interpretation and application of a
non-discrimination obligation must respect the contracting parties’ intended
level of economic integration.
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